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Re-tangling the concept of coercive control: a view from the margins and a response 




This article responds to Walby and Towers’ (2018) article, in which they propose a 
quantitative methodology that evidences gender asymmetry in ‘domestic violence 
crime’ (DVC). Through examining core issues including harm, severity and repetition of 
DVC victimisation, they argue that Stark’s (2007) concept of ‘coercive control’ is obsolete 
and refute Johnson’s (2008) typology of intimate partner violence. However, their 
conclusions are based on problematic assumptions about, for example, the relative 
impacts of physical and non-physical violence; the usefulness of incident- rather than 
relationship-based understandings of domestic violence and abuse (DVA); and a focus 
on victim/survivors’ ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ over perpetrators’ motives. 
Moreover, their cisnormative operationalisation of sex and gender and neglect of 
sexuality overlooks important evidence about lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender 
people’s victimisation. This reinforces a limited ‘public story’ of DVA and arguably 
creates weaknesses in feminist analyses of domestic violence that could further fuel 
anti-feminist, gender-neutral approaches.  
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Recently, Sylvia Walby and colleagues outlined a radical new methodology for surveying 
interpersonal violence (Walby et al. 2016; Walby et al. 2017; Walby and Towers 2017). 
Their aims are two-fold: to facilitate the production of more valid and robust empirical 
evidence about experiences and perpetration of what they call interpersonal violence; 
and to address the ongoing debate about the extent to which gender is implicated within 
it. They argue that ‘the way forward is to include gender within mainstream statistics 
and indicators’ (Walby et al. 2017: 3). Most recently, Walby and Towers (2018) propose 
the concept of domestic violence crime (DVC) as both definition and measure of the 
behaviours that are, in their view, both the most problematic type of interpersonal 
violence and the most emblematic of gender asymmetry.  
 
We refer to intimate partner violence (IPV) in this article when we are discussing any 
acts of violence and/or abuse in intimate adult relationships and from ex-partners. This 
is because we agree with Myhill (2017) and others that there exists different kinds of 
IPV that require careful identification in order to best respond to each; and that in order 
to identify them, motives, impact, and the relationship context for the IPV need to be 
examined. Consequently, we concur with Johnson (2008) and Stark (2007) that 
coercively controlling behaviours constitute a substantively different kind of violence 
and abuse than a one-off incident situationally motivated to win an argument or indicate 
frustration. However, we adopt the term domestic violence and abuse (DVA) to describe 
the most serious kind of IPV – coercively controlling violence, as Johnson would call it – 
because this is the term most widely used, including by the Home Office in England and 
Wales. Additionally, whilst we are aware that in England and Wales the Home Office 
definition of DVA includes familial relationships, for brevity – and in line with existing 
IPV theorisation – we focus only on adult intimate relationships.  
 
In reading Walby and Towers (2018), we have found ourselves in disagreement with 
much – though not by any means, all – of what they say. We found this surprising 
because we identify ourselves as feminists and have drawn from the feminist conceptual 
toolkit during our years of researching IPV in the relationships of lesbians, gay men, 
bisexual women and men, trans women and men and gender non-binary people (LGB 
and/or T+). Our conceptual journey began with agreeing that the feminist focus on 
power and control as defining characteristics of DVA is crucial in being able to identify 
those most at risk of escalation, fear, a closing down of ‘space for action’ (Kelly 2007) 
and significant physical and mental health impacts. We have understood gender as a 
core lens through which IPV should be researched in order to make sense of the 
different experiences, enactments and impacts of IPV, as well as to explore different 
help-seeking practices (see for example Barnes 2008; Donovan and Hester 2014). The 
work of Johnson (2008) and Stark (2012) has underpinned our arguments that 
identifying the different motives for, and meanings and impacts of, IPV are crucial for 
the development of best practice in relation to those who are LGB and/or T+.  
 
That the societal context within which IPV takes place is patriarchal is also axiomic. From 
this follows our agreement that patriarchal influences shape and construct expectations 
and beliefs about how families, intimacy, gender roles and norms might be enacted 
and/or experienced in intimate relationships, regardless of identities of gender and 
sexuality; and that these will be fundamental in understanding experiences and 
perpetration of IPV and societal responses to it. Our feminism has also been 
intersectional (Crenshaw 1994) in its approach, foregrounding an awareness of the 
different social positioning of social groups that coalesce around ‘race’ and ethnicity, 
age, disability (physical and learning), faith, social class, nationality/citizenship status as 
well as gender and sexuality (see Donovan and Hester 2014).  
 
Walby and Towers’ (2018) key argument is that their concept of DVC captures the harm, 
severity and gender-specificity or asymmetry of violence (understood as primarily 
physical and sexual violence) in intimate relationships. For them, this renders 
unnecessary the concept of coercive control and the need to consider non-physical 
violence, including non-physical sexual violence, besides harassment. They argue that, 
rather than focussing on perpetrators’ motives, as Johnson and Stark do, it is more 
important to recognise the ‘resilience’ (or lack thereof) and/or ‘vulnerability’ of the 
victim/survivor as measured by their economic and material (i.e. housing) conditions, 
that can predict escalation in the amount and severity of violence. To respond to Walby 
and Towers’ argument our article is similarly structured to address their key issues of 
contention:  
 1) Gender 
2) Violence and coercion 
3) Seriousness and harm 




A key concern for us in the debates focussing on gender are the assumptions made by 
researchers about what is meant by gender or the categories ‘woman’ and/or ‘man’. 
There is a tendency amongst some feminist and other researchers in the field of IPV to 
confuse the separately (albeit overlapping), socially constructed categories of sex, 
gender and sexuality and use the term ‘gender’ as if it dealt with them all. For example, 
Walby and colleagues (2017, 2018) describe ‘the four gender dimensions’ that should 
be considered when developing a good quality survey of IPV. These include the sex of 
the victim, the sex of the perpetrator, ‘the relationship between perpetrator and victim 
(intimate partner or other family member; acquaintance; or stranger’), and whether or 
not ‘there is a sexual aspect’ (Walby and Towers 2017: 13). From our perspective, 
sexuality is rendered invisible by being subsumed as a ‘gender dimension’. The sexuality 
of the partners to a relationship is crucial to understanding not just the nature of the 
IPV being experienced (including whether there is a ‘sexual aspect’) but also their help-
seeking and help provision. Without recognition of sexuality, ‘gender’ becomes a proxy 
for the categories of woman and man, who are too easily assumed to be heterosexual 
and cisgender. The way in which a problem is defined has important impacts on how 
experiences are recognised, understood and constituted (Kelly 1988; Barnes 2008). This 
has been a critical feminist argument, for example, in campaigns to criminalise rape in 
marriage: without explicitly criminalising a husband forcing his wife to have sex, a wife 
might not problematise the behaviour at all, believing instead that it is within her 
husband’s conjugal rights.  
 
Elsewhere, Donovan and Hester (2010, 2014) argue that an unintended consequence of 
the success of feminist scholarship and activism around DVA has been the construction 
of the public story of DVA. This constructs DVA as a problem of heterosexual (cisgender) 
men for heterosexual (cisgender) women; a problem primarily of physical violence; and 
a problem of a particular presentation of gender: a big ‘strong’ (cisgender) man being 
physically violent towards a small ‘weak’ (cisgender) woman. Whilst this public story 
reflects the empirical evidence about who is most often victimised by DVA, it 
nevertheless makes it very difficult for those whose experiences do not fit this story to 
either tell their story or to be heard. Namely, it excludes not only those who are LGB 
and/or T+ but also cisgender heterosexual men, and any victim, regardless of sexuality 
or gender identity, whose experience is not primarily of physical violence. It also omits 
anyone who has used violence/abusive behaviours themselves in retaliation or in self-
defence, or anybody who is physically bigger than their abuser.  
 
Neglecting to be specific in arguments about gender, i.e. not specifying that the focus of 
concern is actually on heterosexual, cisgender women, is theoretically problematic 
because it implies that the category ‘woman’ (or ‘man’) is stable, fixed and homogenous, 
none of which are the case. This is not only because of the existence of trans women 
and men and of non-binary gender people, but also because feminist analysis tells us 
that women and men are heterogeneous with intersecting identities across the social 
groups listed above, thus shaping how IPV is experienced, understood and responded 
to (Crenshaw 1994). It is also problematic because this theoretical articulation of gender 
implies that, in practice, only the victimisation of heterosexual cisgender women is 
worthy of investigation and intervention. For example, Walby and Towers argue that 
survey data should be collected from women and men (as we agree), to demonstrate 
differences in victimisation; and that to address the way the criminal justice system has 
invisibilised gender, DVC should be mainstreamed within violent crime more broadly, 
rather than considering it as aetiologically distinct (Walby et al. 2016). They argue that 
this will make the gendered nature of all violent crime visible so that policy and 
resources can follow appropriately: ‘[g]ender is woven throughout domestic violent 
crime, in its scale, distribution, repetition and seriousness, as well as in its associations 
with access to economic resources through employment and property’ (Walby and 
Towers 2018: 18). Yet the data, even that collected using Walby and colleagues’ new 
methodology, evidences that other groups also experience IPV, including DVC. 
 
Walby and Towers’ analysis of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), using 
their category of DVC, provides a powerful argument that (ostensibly heterosexual, 
cisgender) women are disproportionately affected by domestic violence crime: 74% of 
DVC victims are women and 82% of DVC is committed against them. However, we do 
not know the gender or sexuality of the perpetrators, nor the sexuality of those 
victimised. Further, even though the proportions are very low, the numbers of men 
affected are still substantial (and will include gay, bisexual and/or trans men as well as 
heterosexual cisgender men) – 79,473 men experiencing 219,118 domestic violence 
crimes. Looking at repeat victimisation, the proportions are similarly stark: 83% of high 
frequency victims (more than 10 incidents in the last 12 months) are women. Yet, 14,064 
men also report high frequency crimes. Considering injury, the proportions are similarly 
disproportionate with 77% of victims reporting DVC with injury being women and 91% 
of domestic violence crimes with injury being reported by women. Still, this means that 
79,549 men report a DVC with injury and 156,441 domestic violence crimes resulting in 
injury are reported by men. Our point is not to challenge the extent of violence against 
women; it is to emphasise that the analysis does not evidence that only women are 
victimised and severely injured by DVC, but rather that they constitute the biggest 
proportion (and numbers) of those victimised. This suggests two things: that a more 
complex approach to gender that includes an understanding of sexuality is required to 
make sense of how and why people, other than heterosexual (cisgender) women, are 
being victimised; and that caution is necessary to not privilege a theoretical paradigm 
over the need for all survivors of IPV to have recourse to appropriate interventions.   
 
We can also look at the proportions of those reporting victimisation in surveys where 
the sexuality of those victimised is used in the analysis, and this should concern anybody 
interested in making sense of IPV either methodologically, theoretically, in policy and/or 
practice. In the most recent Office for National Statistics (ONS 2018) analysis of which 
women are most likely to report partner abuse to the CSEW, bisexual women emerge 
as twice as likely to report (10.9%) partner abuse than heterosexual women (6%), with 
lesbian/gay women also more likely to report than heterosexual women (8%). Looking 
at specific types of abuse, bisexual women, for example, are five times more likely to 
report sexual assault than heterosexual women (1.9% and 0.4% respectively) with 
lesbian/gay women also more likely to report than heterosexual women (0.5%). 
Previously, Donovan and Hester (2014) discussed an analysis by the CSEW of 1000 cases 
of women and men identifying as LGB (Smith et al. 2010). The reported rates of IPV were 
more than twice as high for those identifying as lesbian or gay male (13%) than 
heterosexual/straight people (5%) (cisgender identity was assumed). Furthermore, 12% 
of lesbian or bisexual women and 6% of gay or bisexual men reported experiencing one 
or more instances of non-physical abuse, threats or force (excluding sexual assault) in 
the past 12 months. These proportions are three times and twice as high respectively 
than those reported by heterosexual women (4%) or men (3%) (Smith et al. 2010). Again, 
the sexuality and/or gender identity of the perpetrator are not reported, making it 
difficult to do anything other than speculate about why higher rates are reported. Smith 
et al. (2014) point to age as a factor as 37% of the LGB respondents were aged 16-24 
years compared to 21% of the heterosexual respondents (21%) and this is the age group 
most likely to report partner and sexual violence. Donovan and Hester (2014) speculated 
that the high rates for lesbian or bisexual women might be accounted for by previous 
male partners (see Ristock 2011 for similar patterns in Canada and Walters et al. 2013 
in the US). However, it would seem from these analyses that sexuality and not gender 
predicts the likelihood of reporting victimisation, whilst reinforcing the importance of 
collecting data about the perpetrator. 
 
This pattern is repeated in the Fundamental Rights Agency Violence Against Women: An 
EU-Wide Survey (2014) which asks women participants a question about their sexuality 
and the sex of their partner. Only 526 participants identified as lesbian, bisexual or 
‘other’ [grouped as non-heterosexual in the analysis] so analysis at the individual 
country level was not possible. Analysis at the European level finds non-heterosexual 
people reporting proportionately more than double the amount of ‘physical or sexual 
partner violence’ (48%) than heterosexual women (21%), and nearly double the amount 
of psychological partner violence’ (70% and 43% respectively) (FRA, 2014: 185). Such 
dramatically different proportions are surely worthy of further research, suggesting 
again that it is sexuality and not gender that is the key predictor of reporting IPV.  
 
In their quantitative survey of 1,754 young people from across the UK, Bailey et al. 
(2018) explore possible links between partner abuse and sexual health.  Whilst the 
numbers of those identifying as having had exclusively same-gender partners (they label 
these F-F or M-M) or both female (F) and male (M) partners (labelled F-MF and M-FM) 
was too small to conduct the regression analysis to explore relationships between 
demographic and sexual health variables, the descriptive statistics tell an interesting 
story. Higher proportions of F-MF and M-FM report experiencing each of the six types 
of physical, emotional and sexual violence and abuse asked about than those identifying 
as F-M, i.e. ostensibly heterosexual women; higher proportions of M-M report 
experiencing five of the six types of violence and abuse asked about than F-M; and F-F 
reported experiencing more emotional and physical violence and abuse but lower sexual 
violence and abuse and levels of fear of an ex-/partner than F-M report. The trans 
participants and those with a trans partner were excluded from the analysis.  
 
In their discussion, Bailey et al. (2018) retain the focus on the numerical fact that young 
women rather than young men most often report partner violence and abuse, rather 
than showing any curiosity or concern about their finding that bi/pansexuality predicts 
the reporting of IPV, not gender. Their stated aim is to discover whether experiencing 
partner abuse might impact negatively on young people’s sexual health. The correlation 
is found most strongly with heterosexual young women and less strongly with young 
heterosexual men. Yet, there is no speculation about the impacts for their bisexual and 
gay male or lesbian participants. The conclusions do not even call for urgent research to 
be done with these groups to explore these issues nor any methodological speculation 
about how more young people who are not heterosexual can be recruited into studies 
such as this so as to improve the likelihood that the same statistical analysis can be done.  
 
Nevertheless, these studies design a methodology identifying those who are not 
heterosexual which is an improvement, on the whole, on the research methodologies 
adopted in the heteronormative mainstream field of IPV. Yet it seems that the 
methodology is used, at worst, to better ‘clean’ the data for an analysis focussed on 
heterosexual cisgender women and men or, at best, to signal an inclusive research 
project. The latter aim backfires of course when the subsequent analysis excludes 
groups because there are not enough to conduct statistical analysis. The end result is 
the invisibilisation of LGB and/or T people from wider, mainstream discussions of IPV 
and interventions to respond to this social problem; a similar problem to that which 
Walby and colleagues (Walby et al. 2017; Walby and Towers 2018) point to in 
mainstream approaches to violent crime that render gender invisible, yet one that they 
repeat in their proposed methodology with respect to sexuality.   
 
Another problematic aspect of a sole focus on gender is the reductionist assumptions 
made about what gender signifies. Thus, gender is used to signal both binaried sex 
categories (woman, man) as well as binaried gendered behaviours: women are 
victimised, men are perpetrators. However, the ways in which gender operates in 
relationships of IPV have been shown to be more complex than this. In their qualitative 
analysis of interviews with lesbians, bisexual and queer women, gay and homosexual 
men and heterosexual women (all cisgender), Donovan and Hester (2014) identify two 
‘relationship rules’ in violent and abusive relationships regardless of sexuality and/or 
gender identity. The first is that the relationship is for the abusive partner and on their 
terms; and the second is that the victim/survivor is responsible for the abusive 
behaviour, the abusive partner, the relationship, the household if they share one and 
the children if they have them. These rules resonate to some extent with 
heteronormative constructions of heterosexual relationships that confers on men the 
role as initiator, decision-maker, and relationship authority, while the woman’s role is 
to be the deferrer, the responder, the one doing the emotional work. Yet, these 
relationship rules were found in same-sex and heterosexual relationships.  
 
Donovan and Hester (2014) also found that violent and abusive relationships were more 
complicated than this apparently ‘gendered’ relationship type. They found that whilst 
abusive partners set the terms for the relationship, they are also often the most needy 
of the two partners, eliciting forgiveness, loyalty, protection, special treatment from 
their partners. Engaging in the latter often left victim/survivors feeling not like the classic 
‘ideal victim’; passive, without agency, defenceless (Christie 1986), but instead as the 
(emotionally) stronger and responsible partner who manages their abusive partner and 
the relationship. It would seem useful therefore to consider the consequences for those 
experiencing IPV of dominant discourses about IPV that confuse sex, gender and 
sexuality in discussion about what IPV is and rely on narrowly-presented binaried 
assumptions about how gender might be enacted and experienced.  
 
Thus, whilst we agree with Walby and Towers’ argument that survey data should be 
collected from women and men to demonstrate gender differences in victimisation, we 
would also argue that it is as important to establish victim and perpetrator sexuality and 
the relationship context in order to properly explore the relative importance of these 
factors on IPV reporting.  
 
2) Violence and coercion 
 
Walby and Towers argue that violence is always coercive even, as per Gramsci and 
Weber, if its use is only occasional, and that the law recognises this by default. They 
therefore dispute Johnson’s (2008) perspective that not all IPV is coercive and Stark’s 
(2007) emphasis on the non-physical rather than physical forms being most coercive 
because of their relationship to gender inequality. We argue that this incorrectly 
conflates violence with the exercise of power over another. The argument that all 
violence is coercive helps to underpin two wider points that Walby and Towers make: 
DVC should not be an aetiologically separate field of study to violent crime; and there is 
no need for separate concepts such as coercive control which, in their view, falsely 
exaggerate the distinctiveness of DVC from general violent crime.  
 
Yet, to state that all violence is coercive bypasses a huge degree of nuance, conflating 
violence with a coercive intent and violence in self-defence, anticipation or retaliation. 
It also fails to distinguish between the impacts of being in an intimate relationship with 
someone who one knows will readily use violence against them versus a single incident 
of stranger violence. Further, while it can perhaps be argued that all violence is coercive 
insofar as it seeks to sway the outcome or course of a situation (even if that is to 
incapacitate a primary perpetrator), this seems rather questionable when one’s violence 
is intertwined with a partner’s use of violence. The antecedents to the use of violence 
are not effectively captured in quantitative research, resulting in a very partial picture 
of how and why violence is used in intimate relationships, and to what effect.  
 
For example, Myhill (2017) points to the risk that a primary perpetrator could be 
counted as a victim of DVC if they were to report any physical violence from their partner 
either to the police or in a victimisation survey. He states that best practice and 
appropriate interventions rely on being able to understand the context for physical 
violence because most of the victims presenting at domestic violence services are 
experiencing coercive control (see also Leone, Johnson and Cohan’s 2007 findings that 
[heterosexual, cisgender] women at greatest risk and/or fear are most likely to seek 
help). Establishing the extent of coercive control in those reporting IPV would, Myhill 
argues, provide important intelligence to use for provision planning and resource 
requirements. This evidence also has relevance for Walby and Towers’ argument about 
violence and harm insofar as perceptions of risk might also include perceptions of harm 
and be implicated in decisions about help-seeking. Similarly, Hester (2013) has shown in 
a mixed-methods study of police arrests of IPV perpetrators in one English police force 
that women arrested were more likely than the men to have used weapons, arguably 
because women were not confident about defending themselves without a weapon. In 
general, however, women were also twice as likely to be arrested as men. Yet, in Walby 
and Towers’ (2018) analysis, use of a weapon is counted as amongst the most serious 
crimes which could act to distort understanding about women's violence against men as 
it suggests they are more likely to enact the most serious crimes. At the same time their 
approach seems to undermine feminist exhortations to move away from an incident-
based to a relationship context approach to understanding IPV (e.g. Stark 2007).  
 
Moreover, the presentation of physical violence as the only authentic way of coercing a 
partner is problematic. Identity abuse provides a good example of (most often) non-
physical violence by which abusive partners can exert coercive power and control, which 
would not be recognised in Walby and Towers’ proposed methodology. Identity abuse 
is an aspect of DVA that is seldom explicitly researched in studies of cisgender, 
heterosexual women, although it has implicitly been evidenced in how abusive partners 
undermine, belittle and punish ex/partners, drawing on cisgender, heteronormative 
assumptions as justification. For example, Dobash and Dobash (1998) and Stark (2007) 
evidenced abusive cisgender, heterosexual men controlling the presentation of 
femininity that the women they victimise are allowed: their hair style, use of make-up, 
clothing as well as their behaviours.  
 
Similarly, identity abuse on the grounds of LGB and/or T+ identities illustrates the ways 
in which patriarchal systems are deeply heteronormative and provide opportunities for 
coercive control. Abusive partners coercively control by, for example, threatening to out 
their partners, undermining their partner’s sense of self as, for example, a ‘real’ lesbian 
or trans man, denigrating local LGBT scenes or venues to isolate their partner and/or 
drawing attention to parts of a partner’s body in ways that are demeaning or run 
counter to their gender identity (e.g. Donovan and Hester 2014; Donovan, Barnes and 
Nixon 2014). These can all only be effective in a society that does not fully accept the 
equal social status of those who are LGB and/or T+. The fact that identity abuse can be 
particularly effective with those only recently out into their sexuality and/or gender 
identity, with little experience of life and intimate relationships as an LGB and/or T 
person points to the situated vulnerability of those who are in their first relationship as 
an LGB and/or T person (Ristock 2002; Donovan and Hester 2008, 2014). Donovan et al. 
(2014) speak about the use of ‘experiential power’, where abusive partners who are 
already out, regardless of their age in relation to their partner, use their prior knowledge 
of the local scene and local subcultures of ‘gay’ life to coercively control them (Donovan 
et al. 2014). Accounting for these kinds of behaviours must be a part of how we 
recognise and identify IPV and whilst we agree with Myhill (2017) that discussions 
should take place about how to operationalise empirically robust measures of these 
types of behaviours, we have a broader constituency of victims in mind.  
 
Walby and Towers (2018) also argue that it is better to measure each violent incident 
than a single course of conduct. We agree that the re-analysis of CSEW data to lift the 
cap on the maximum number of incidents that can be counted is a critical development 
(Walby et al. 2016). However, we are concerned about a blurring of what is expedient 
methodologically with how victims/survivors understand their lived experience. Our 
research leads us to argue that restricting DVA only to those acts defined as DVC 
provides a partial picture of the experiences reported by survivors (Donovan and Hester 
2014). Coercive control, a concept arising from qualitative research with 
victim/survivors (e.g. Walklate et al. 2018), captures the range and/or pattern of 
behaviours – not only or necessarily ever, physical violence – that cumulatively result in 
one partner exerting power and control over the other (Stark 2007). A focus on DVC 
appears to be a reductionist solution, separating and prioritising material impacts of 
physical violence over the more holistic understanding of the ways that coercive control 
can, cumulatively, exert profound emotional and social impacts.  
 
A focus on DVC might provide a methodology that makes it easier to count behaviours, 
but the data is unstable as a measure either of the prevalence of what an individual 
might be experiencing in their abusive relationship or of the most serious IPV (see 
below). In addition, unless there is an assessment of how any (repeated) incident ‘fits’ 
within the relationship as a whole, the wrong person could be identified as a perpetrator 
and the victim/survivor’s needs will go unrecognised.  
 3) Seriousness and harm 
 
Walby and Towers argue that physical violence is the most physically harmful, and 
therefore the most serious, type of violence (including stalking), as per the hierarchy of 
harms designated by criminal law e.g. in sentencing guidelines. This contradicts 
Johnson’s distinction between physical violence in the context of situational couple 
violence being (typically) less serious than physical violence in the context of coercive 
controlling violence (Johnson 2017). 
 
It is an astounding oversight to read harm only in physical ways. Physical injuries might 
be more measurable, yet research with (heterosexual cisgender women) survivors 
foreground the impacts of non-physical violence (Kirkwood 1993; Wilcox 2006; 
Williamson 2010) including impeding their help-seeking. We accept that problems with 
the data are not straightforward and agree with Walby et al.’s (2017) argument that 
surveys relying on the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) are deeply problematic for their lack 
of context; limited attention to impact; and, ironically, their approach to counting 
incidents of IPV. We agree that in order to construct a profile of IPV across a population 
it is important to get a sense of how much and what range of IPV individuals have 
experienced as well as impacts (see Hester, Donovan and Fahmy 2010; Donovan and 
Hester 2014). Our methodological approach values listening to the voices of those most 
marginalised in society in order to make sense of the legacies of a society based on 
hierarchies of gender, sexuality, ‘race’ and ethnicity, faith, age, physical and mental 
capacity and the legitimising of economic inequalities. It is important to (re-)state the 
critical contribution of qualitative research to the field of IPV in its own right and also in 
informing the design, the analysis and interpretation of quantitative data. 
 
Whilst Walby and Towers (2018) develop a robust argument against considering 
typologies of IPV reflecting the motivations of perpetrators, they nevertheless create 
their own hierarchical typology of IPV. Their typology makes cumulative distinctions 
between those who have experienced physical violence that reaches the threshold of 
an existing crime and those who have not; those whose experiences of physical violence 
have resulted in any physical injury or not; those who have experienced threats of 
physical violence that have frightened them or not; and repeat victimisation of these 
behaviours, in the previous year or ever. These criteria construct what is for them the 
worst type of IPV, DVC, whilst side-lining other experiences as ‘not domestic violence 
crime’.  
 
Walby and Towers (2018) argue that the legal definition of violence captures intent and 
harm: if there is no harm, there is no crime. They reject Johnson’s (2008) and Stark’s 
(2007) conceptualisations of the relationship between harm and violence as dependent 
on particular relationship dynamics. They are also (rightly) critical of the CTS for only 
considering the act, devoid of the contextual detail of harm to the victim, which they 
say falsely reveals gender symmetry. 
 
However, what this overlooks are other contextual details such as the meanings of 
violence. Violence means something different when it is perpetrated by someone whom 
one loves, trusts, feels compassion or responsibility towards. Violence also means 
something different, and exerts different, less visible, harms, when it is perpetrated by 
an intimate partner, in one’s safe spaces, in the presence of/proximity to one’s children. 
The meanings of violence are also mediated by social identities, biographies and 
individuals’ resources (Anderson 2009), resonating with Walby and Towers’ discussion 
of resilience and vulnerability. But, what victims/survivors decide to report – either in a 
survey or to an agency or informal source of support – is determined by a much more 
complex array of factors than simply whether a violent act has taken place and whether 
it has caused harm. To fall back on how the criminal justice system handles harm is 
deeply problematic. Little more than a cursory glance at attrition rates, sentencing data 
and conviction rates is required to know that victims/survivors receive neither equal 
recognition of their victimisation nor equal acknowledgement of the harms inflicted 
upon them.  
 
In our research we see this as a consequence of the public story of DVA where on the 
one hand, only women are victims and only men, perpetrators; and on the other hand, 
in a relationship between two women or two men, any violence must be equal, or 
mutual, because they are assumed to be equally matched; and the violence will not be 
very serious either because they are women and women are not violent, or because 
they are men and used to fighting and defending themselves. Not only can practitioners 
make these assumptions (see Ristock 2002), but also researchers (see Johnson’s early 
work 1995). Several studies have been conducted in the United States with different 
groups of practitioners who perceive risk and safety differently depending on the 
sexuality and/or gender of the victim/survivors and perpetrators. How seriously 
violence between women is perceived (by psychology students) is influenced by 
whether the victim/survivor is understood to be ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ (Little and 
Terrance 2010); the violence of men towards men is recognised as potentially serious 
by police, but not as serious as the violence of men towards women (Pattavina et al. 
2007); the risks of escalation are not perceived by crisis (refuge) centre workers as being 
as high for survivors in same-sex DVA scenarios as in opposite-sex scenarios (Brown and 
Groscup 2009). This evidence can be seen to challenge the premise of Walby and 
Towers’ (2018) argument that harm, as measured by crime, is somehow factually 
established. On the contrary this evidence suggests that perceived harm is subjective 
and socially constructed, being judged by many factors including the sexuality and 
gender of the protagonists, and not only the type of physical violence used.  
 
4) Motivation and resilience 
 
Walby and Towers ask, ‘are variations in the extent and seriousness of domestic violence 
best explained by the motivation of the offender or the resilience of the victim?’ (2018: 
14). They use the arguably individualistic terms ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ when 
actually they mean (cisgender, heterosexual) women with limited access to economic 
and material resource. This is because Walby et al. (2016) demonstrate, by removing 
the cap of five incidents of violence in reports from the CSEW, that DVC victimisation 
has been increasing in the CSEW since the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
However, it seems odd, firstly, to posit perpetrator motivations versus victim resilience 
as an either/or in analysis of IPV. Without an understanding of what motivates 
perpetrators, it is not possible to develop appropriate perpetrator interventions, plus 
motives are important in criminal justice processes e.g. in determining whether a 
homicide is manslaughter or murder and in ascertaining whether an act of violence was 
self-defensive. Secondly, Walby and Towers draw attention to vital economic and 
material factors that shape experiences of leaving and help-seeking with respect to IPV. 
Yet, to suggest that only economic factors prevent victims/survivors from leaving 
abusive partners is far too limiting, and again glosses over quantitative and qualitative 
evidence demonstrating that a much wider range of factors is at play (Donovan and 
Hester 2014). Thirdly, survivors’ so-called ‘resilience’ cannot be separated from 
perpetrator motives, since the latter can include reducing their partner’s financial 
independence and shrinking their social networks as well as diminishing their 
confidence, such that their options for leaving the relationship are restricted. Without 
understanding the dynamics of coercive control, however, it is difficult to understand 
how this ‘entrapment’ (Stark 2007) comes about. Even if unintentional, the language of 
resilience and vulnerability risks conjuring up neoliberal ideas about the responsibilised 
citizen (Rose 2000), responsible not only for their own success but also their own 
failures, thereby putting the onus on survivors to transform their material 
circumstances. 
 
It is also unexpected to find Walby and Towers promoting a focus solely on survivors 
and not including perpetrators because this seems out of step with current feminist and 
policy thinking that has called for increased perpetrator accountability (Westmarland 
and Kelly 2012; Home Office 2016). Considering the motivations and intent of 
perpetrators is not to imply that some forms of IPV are more or less acceptable: all IPV 
is concerning and should be addressed appropriately to ensure that it stops. However, 
making a judgement about what violence and/or abuse has happened and why, with 
what intention and in what context is fundamental to ensuring that any response is 
reasonable, just, proportional, informed, likely to get buy-in from the partners to the 
relationship and maximises safety and wellbeing. It is our belief that in order to achieve 
this, practitioners should be confident and have expertise to draw on that enables them 
to ascertain what IPV they are being approached for help with and what interventions 
will be most effective. 
 
Walby and Towers critique (rightly, we would argue) the impression that typologies such 
as Johnson’s give that different types of violence are discrete and stable, thus neglecting 
the potential for movement within types. They dispute the idea that there are different 
types, arguing instead that what is being observed is escalation. Thus, all violence can 
become what Johnson describes as coercively controlling violence if, due to lower 
‘resilience’, the victim/survivor does not have the resources to leave the abusive 
relationship prior to the frequency and severity of the violence escalating.  
 
Echoing the previous discussion, it is too limiting to suggest that escalation only occurs 
because the victim does not have the financial means to leave the abusive relationship. 
For example, arguably at a time of their greatest agency, when they decide they will 
leave, survivors can face an escalation in violence and abuse (Campbell et al. 2009). The 
assumption is also made that all victims/survivors want to leave the abusive relationship 
as soon as violence becomes evident, and yet again this is not what the qualitative 
evidence tells us (Donovan and Hester 2014). There is much more complexity in 
decisions to leave abusive partners, as evidenced in both the research with heterosexual 
women and research on LGB and/or T people’s experiences of IPV. The impact of love 
here is also important as it is often given as a reason why survivors remain or return to 
abusive relationships (Donovan and Hester 2014).  
 
However, rejecting the idea of typologies in favour of a focus on DVC is a retrograde 
step. It also seems to contradict Walby and Towers’ own critique of the risk assessment 
tools used by most police authorities in England and Wales to categorise risk. They argue 
that such tools can result in not providing interventions to those at lowest risk with the 
danger that the potential for escalation is missed. Risk assessment scales, like Johnson’s 
typologies, they argue, assume stable categories (even though Johnson (2017) does not 
say that the violence identified as situational couple violence could not escalate, only 
that it is less likely to than coercively controlling violence). In their proposal, however, 
those deemed not to have experienced DVC are not assumed to have any risk of 
escalation to physical violence, even though they might have experienced identity 
abuse, isolation from friends and/or family, financial abuse and/or any forms of 
degradation, none of which would be counted in Walby and Towers’ (2018) proposed 
methodology. 
 
Conclusion   
 
This article sets out a response to the claims made by Walby and Towers (2018) in 
justification of their proposed new methodology to measure and evidence gender 
asymmetry in DVC. Our response challenges the heteronormative and cisnormative 
ways in which their analysis privileges a particular operationalisation of gender in order 
to achieve their goal of designing a methodology that will prove gender asymmetry. 
Their proposed methodology would reinforce the public story of DVA which we argue 
would be a retrograde step, privileging physical violence in the relationships of 
ostensibly cisgender heterosexual people. We have problematised their apparent trust 
in criminal justice system definitions and categories of crime as a basis for their 
measurements.  
 
These concerns notwithstanding, a focus on the category ‘woman’ is understandable 
and defensible, particularly in a context of austerity when there is increasing 
competition for reduced funds to provide services. Whilst heterosexual cisgender 
women may not be proportionately the group most likely to report DVA in victimisation 
surveys, they are numerically, and thus it is women who most often appear in services 
(e.g. see Myhill 2017). Again, it is important to remember that it is not clear what 
sexuality the women are because most police data collection systems do not report on 
the sexuality and/or relationship type of the victim/survivor reporting. The Westminster 
Government have insisted that their support for IPV service provision, including women-
only services, remains constant, but insist that, ultimately, decisions about local services 
are local government decisions (Donovan and Durey 2018). Yet, the evidence mounts 
that funding for the domestic violence sector and for women-only services particularly 
is under threat (Towers and Walby, 2012; Davidge and Magnusson, 2018).  
 
We have demonstrated that those who are not heterosexual or cisgender are rendered 
invisible in research even when the proportions of them reporting of IPV is demonstrably 
higher than heterosexual women. We suggest that in the quest to address the very real 
threats to the gains made by feminist activism, scholarship and practice in the last forty 
years or so by encroaching gender-neutral, anti-feminist arguments being made about 
the nature of IPV, the experiences of LGB and/or T+ (and other) victims/survivors are 
being indefensibly negated in spite of their very real experiences of harm. We would 
therefore urge the mainstream IPV research community to become more inclusive, 
theoretically and methodologically, in order to stop reproducing both the invisibility of 
LGB and/or T+ victims/survivors and to stop perpetuating the heterosexual, cisgender 
assumption. This is vital if the overlapping risks of gender and sexuality are to be 
identified in order to better make sense of IPV as well as to support adequate 
interventions for all survivors. This is not a plea for simple inclusion but, more broadly, 
an argument against a methodology, seemingly driven by ideological concerns, that is in 
danger of rendering invisible many of the lived experiences of all victim/survivors across 
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